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AUTHOR Lewis, Frank W.
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ABSTRACT

The paper presents key features of Jean Piaget's theory of moral development, compares Piaget's theory with Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development and Sidney Simon's theory of values clarification, and evaluates the values clarification movement in light of Piaget's theoretical and practical conclusions. The focus is twofold: first, on the theories presented to explain human moral development; and second, on the practical educational program proposed by each position to promote moral growth. The author discusses numerous critical evaluations of these theories by philosophers of education and by other educational professionals. The evaluations indicate that Piaget differs with Kohlberg over the cognitive, distinct, and non-shifting nature of Kohlberg's stages of development in moral reasoning. Piaget also differs with Simon over the stress on the impact of thought on action rather than the Piagetian emphasis on the influence of action on thought. Included in the bibliography are major works by Piaget, Kohlberg, and Simon; all critical works cited in the paper; and works which provide general background information on moral development. (Author/DB)

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A PIAGETIAN CRITIQUE OF KOHLBERG'S 'MORAL DEVELOPMENT' AND OF SIMON'S 'VALUES CLARIFICATION'

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Frank W. Lewis, S.J., Ed.D.

Associate Professor, Director
Foundations & Teaching Division
Graduate School of Education

Fairfield University
Fairfield, CT 06430

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INTRODUCTION This study attempts to do three things: first, to present key features of Jean Piaget's theory of moral development, and the practical suggestions he makes for promoting moral growth; second, to compare Piaget's theory with Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development, and to compare Kohlberg's suggestions for moral education to Piaget's; and third, to evaluate the program and strategies of the Values Clarification movement in the light of Piaget's theoretical and practical conclusions. Some familiarity with Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development and with his proposals for moral education, on the one hand, and with the values clarification seven-step process and the strategies for its use, on the other hand, is assumed. Included here are summaries of the many critical evaluations of both these value education movements by philosophers of education and by other educational professionals. In the presentation of the various positions, no attempt is made to critically evaluate the empirical research as to its design, its execution, or its interpretation. The present author is not a professional experimental psychologist; criticism of the research is better left to such professionals. Here the focus is twofold: on the theory presented to explain human moral development, and on the practical educational program to promote moral growth which each position proposes. This author was inspired to return to closer scrutiny of Piaget's thinking by his involvement, three years ago, in a graduate seminar on learning values. Most of Piaget's research effort has been directed to aspects of human cognitive development, but his writings also contain fascinating presentations of his views on moral growth. Unpacking his dense summary presentations about moral development is not often easy, but it has always been immensely profitable.

JEAN PIAGET: THEORY AND PRACTICE We begin with an exposition of some of the key features of Piaget's moral development theory and of his practical suggestions for moral education, which we will then use as foci for the comparison of his ideas with the theories and education programs of Lawrence Kohlberg and of the Values Clarification movement.

Combining insights gained from his own research with others' suggestions which he found compatible with his empirical findings, Piaget presents a description of the origins and development of morality. His model of moral growth is developmental, and simpler than his complicated model of cognitive development. He describes an evolution, wherein, after a couple of years of pre-moral sensori-motor development (which provides the basis for subsequent moral growth, but is not properly moral), the young child develops gradually from a predominantly heteronomous moral agent, through an intermediate adolescent period of consciously egocentric autonomy, to a predominantly reciprocal moral agent. Piaget studied the child's growth in the understanding and practice of game-rules, the influences on the child's moral behavior of his spontaneous moral 'realism' and of the constraint of elders, the progressive development of the child's sense of justice, and of his convictions regarding punishment.

The very young child, Piaget tells us, is 'egocentric', not because he consciously subordinates everything to self-interest, but because he has not yet dissociated the personal 'self' from the rest of reality. The newborn, a complex bundle of active processes, almost totally dependent upon others, is an astonishing reservoir of "potentialities" which must be actualized through a process of

self-construction in diverse complex interactions with the persons, things, and events of his experienced world. Throughout these interactions, by a process of adaptation which is both an assimilation and an accomodation, the growing person strives to maintain a dynamic equilibrium. For Piaget neither genes nor environment, however necessary, furnish adequate explanation of human growth. Against innatists and social learning theorists he defends an 'interactionist' explanation of the phenomena of human development. The person is the primary architect of his own growth; he is not the fated victim of either heredity or environmental pressures. "From the moral as from the intellectual point of view," Piaget insists," the child is born neither good nor bad, but master of his destiny"(1965, p.99). "Neither logical nor moral norms are innate in the individual mind," Piaget (1965, p. 398) argues; logic itself is created, never innate," and the same is true of morality (1973, pp. 48-52). The newborn is not a passive reaction mechanism awaiting external stimulation, as some learning theorists suggest. There is a dynamic thrust from within the organism toward its own development, as Piaget suggests by observing that "given sufficient liberty of action, the child will spontaneously emerge from his egocentrism and tend with his whole being towards cooperation"(1985, p. 190). Hence, for him the value of what he calls the 'active' methods of education is that the "spontaneous organization of the children themselves " permits them "to work out a discipline where necessity is discovered in action itself"(1965, p.121). They "lead the child to construct for himself the tools that will transform him from the inside," including moral structures (Ibid.). He finds in the phenomena of development a teleology, a tending toward an ideal norm of equilibrium, toward which the phenomena "cannot help but tend"(1965, pp. 317-318, 399).

For human development this ideal norm is the mature personality which "could be defined by terming it a reciprocal 'rapport'"(1973, p.90). Personality is opposed to both restraint and anarchy, for its two correlative aspects are 'independence' and 'reciprocity.' In morality the personality "freely accepts some kind of discipline, or contributes to its creation, by voluntarily subjecting himself to a system of mutual 'norms' that subordinate his liberty in respect to that of others"(1973, pp. 90-91, 111-112). The goal-norm or 'telos' of human growth, cognitive and moral, is this 'reciprocal autonomy.'

For elders, especially parents, the very young child develops respect, a mixture of fear and love, which is the source of the sense of duty and feelings of obligation which are the foundation of moral conscience (1969, pp. 123-124). Allied with this unilateral respect for caring and powerful elders is a dependency upon them. As the child comes to recognize that his elders acknowledge rules and laws as binding them, he comes to view the norms as having moral authority in and of themselves. When he experiences the imperfections of the elders' administration of justice and finds himself confronted by conflicting norms among which he must choose, his unilateral respect for externally imposed rules yields gradually, through collaborative experiences in shared play and projects, to a mutual respect between equals who respect one another's autonomy. (1965, pp. 116-117) Liberated from servile submission the autonomous person is able to engage in mutual commitments and to learn to impose on self the discipline necessary for satisfying collaboration. "The rule is no longer respected as the product of an external will but as the result of an explicit or tacit accord. For this reason the rule is truly respected in practice and not just in its verbal formulations. It is obligatory to the extent that the individual consents auto-

nomously to the agreement on which the rule is based "(1967, p.56). In many places (e.g., 1965, pp. 319-320; 1967, p. 57; 1969, p.127), Piaget explains that this mutual respect and reciprocity in cooperation between peers is the origin of the sense of justice. Adult authority, even if it acts in conformity with justice, reinforces submission which is the contradictory of that free consent without which justice cannot come into being. The sense of justice actually emerges "at the expense of parents"(1969, p. 127) and "as a reaction to the adult rather than as an acquisition from him"(1967, p.57). In the early years the adult, insofar as he practices reciprocity with the child and preaches by example rather than by precept," can exercise "here, as always, an enormous influence"(1965, p. 319). As the child approaches adolescence and comes, secretly at least, to consider himself as the adult's equal, cooperation between child and adult becomes an influence on the child's sense of justice (1965, pp. 319-320). Certain key features of the developmental progression to moral maturity, as Piaget views this process, will now be examined.

DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES It should be noted from the beginning that Piaget has always been candid about the limitations of the developmental stage model (Lewis, 1978a). He has defended the necessity, validity, and utility of such a model, but has frequently underlined the arbitrariness, ambiguity, complexity, and other limitations of such theoretical constructs(e.g., 1965, pp. 27-28, 84-86, 284; 1970, pp. 166-173). Piaget seems particularly uncomfortable with the utilization of the stage model for moral development. Reporting his study of the evolution of the child's sense of justice, he concludes that "insofar as one can talk of stages in the moral life, the existence of three great periods" is suggested (1965,

p. 315). "There are, therefore," he cautions, "no inclusive stages which define the whole of a subject's mental life at a given point of his evolution. .... We cannot therefore speak of global or inclusive stages. .... Any oversharp discontinuities are anlytic devices and not objective results"(1965, pp. 85-87). In the child he detects two moralities which "are due to formative processes which, broadly speaking, follow one another without, however, constituting definite stages. It is possible,"he adds, "to note the existence of an intermediate phase"(1965, p. 194). In the conclusion to the study of game-rules Piaget, noting a progression from motor rules through coercive rules to what he calls "rational" rules, raises the question about characterizing sequential periods of development as being different in degree or being different in kind. He remarks that "it is difficult to think of a difference in kind without the presence of at least some functional continuity, so that between two successive structures a succession of intermediate degrees could be found"(1965, p. 84). He then explains that 'stage' differences should be thought of as differences in the proportion in which various elements (present throughout the whole development) are mixed. "There is an adult in every child, and a child in every adult. .... Two sets of phenomena are to be met both in the child and in the adult, but one set predominates in the one, and the other in the other"(1965, p.85). In Piaget's cognitive development theory, the stages are cumulative, not consecutive. In his explanation of moral development the different periods of growth are characterized by shifts in the preponderence of elements that are present throughout the entire lifespan. There would be even greater danger here of depicting the sequential periods as discrete, distinctive stages, or of assigning stages on the basis of the appearance of elements always present without being careful to determine their proportional influence.

MORALITY AND AFFECTIVITY For Piaget morality concerns itself with the ethical dimension of human behavior. When he speaks of the 'emotional' tendencies natural to the child which are the basis for morality(1973 , p.112) or of the 'feeling' of obligation (Ibid., pp. 114,115), or of "ethical feelings"(Ibid., p.113), or of "ethical sentiments"(Ibid., p. 115), it is obvious that the affective or emotional is an important ingredient in "ethical behavior"(Ibid., p. 116). When he refers to the ethical 'conscience' as "practical mind"(Ibid., p. 113), or to "ethical judgement"(Ibid., p. 119), and publishes a large study of The Moral Judgement of the Child (1965) it is obvious that he regards the cognitive or intellectual as also an important ingredient in the "ethical" or "moral"'personality'(1973., pp. 118,124). Is he emotivist or is he cognitivist? Neither! He is both! The moral is both cognitive and affective. Moral conscience and ethical values develop through'ethical relations'(Ibid., pp.116, 117). The ethical personality (p.118) is formed in a social atmosphere "formed of affection and freedom"(p.111), in which emerge "interindividual relationships that are formative of ethical values"(p. 117), which include feelings of an individual for an individual(p.113) that help engender mutual respect. It is interesting to notice that Piaget (unlike Kant) roots morality in the relations between individuals, not in the relation of an individual to an abstract entity called 'society'(cf. Lewis 1977). His morality is social in the sense that it is interpersonal. It is third-person only because it is second-person. He has little to say about the first-person morality of personal integrity, perhaps because such a focus has only recently been restored to respectability among philosophers and psychologists.

What is important to note here is Piaget's view of the cognitive

and the affective as parallel, inseparable, and irreducible. He traces their correlative development in some recent publications (1969, pp. 21-27, 114-129, 149-151; 1967, pp. 15-17, 33-38, 54-60, 64-70; 1973, pp. 109-126), though he had presented his position almost half a century ago, in THE MORAL JUDGEMENT OF THE CHILD(1965).

> There is a constant parallel between the affective and intellectual life throughout childhood and adolescence. This statement will seem surprising only if one attempts to dichotomize the life of the mind into emotions and thoughts. But nothing could be more false or superficial. In reality, the element to which we must constantly turn in the analysis of mental life is 'behavior' itself, conceived, as we have tried to point out .... as a re-establishment or strengthening of equilibrium. All behavior presupposes instruments and techniques movements and intelligence. But all behavior also implies motives and final values (goals): the sentiments. Thus affectivity and intelligence are indissociable and constitute two complementary aspects of all human behavior. (1967, p.15)

For Piaget, there is this close parallelism between the development of affectivity and that of the intellectual functions because these "are two indissociable aspects of every action."

> In all behavior the motives and energizing dynamisms reveal affectivity, while the techniques and adjustment of the means employed constitute the sognitive sensori-motor or rational aspect. There is never a purely intellectual action, and numerous emotions, interests, values, expressions of harmony, etc. intervene. .... Likewise, there is never a purely affective act. .... Always and everywhere .... both elements are involved because the one presupposes the other.(1967, pp.33-34)

In another work, Piaget reaffirms his view:

> Affectivity constitutes the energetics of behavior patterns whose cognitive aspect refers to structures alone. There is no behavior pattern, however intellectual, which does not involve affective factors as motives; but, reciprocally, there can be no affective states without the intervention of perceptions or comprehensions which constitute their cognitive structure. Behavior is therefore of a piece, even if the structures do not explain its energetics, and if, vice versa, its energetics do not account for its structures. The two aspects, cognitive and affective, are at the same time inseparable and irreducible. (1969, p. 158)

"Logic," Piaget tells us, "is not co-extensive with intelligence,

but consists of the sum-total of rules of control which intelligence makes use of for its own direction. Morality", he continues,"plays a similar part with regard to the affective life"(1965, p. 398). For Piaget, "Logic is the morality of thought just as morality is the logic of action"(Ibid.), and "reason, which expresses the highest form of equilibrium, reunites intelligence and affectivity"(1967, p. 70).

> When behavior is studied in its cognitive aspect we are concerned with its structures; when behavior is considered in its affective aspects, we are concerned with its energetics. .... While these two aspects cannot be reduced to a single aspect, they are nevertheless inseparable and complementary. For this reason we must not be surprised to find a marked parallelism in their respective evolutions. (1969, p. 21)

An adequate consideration of moral behavior must include an examination of both aspects, the cognitive and the affective. Piaget studied the cognitive aspect in his classical investigations (1965), and warned us all that "studying the child's affectivity is much more difficult than studying his cognitive functions, however, for the risk of "adultomorphism" is much greater in this area"(1969, p.21). Piaget's ventures into theorizing about the affective dimension of the moral have been few and generic, but extremely thought-provoking, as, for example, in his remarks about the 'will':

> To the extent that the emotions become organized they emerge as regulations whose final form of equilibrium is none other than the will. Thus, will is the true affective qquivalent of the operation in reason. .... Will appears when there is a conflict of tendencies or tensions. .... Will power involves reinforcing the superior but weaker tendency so as to make it triumph. .... Will .... is a regulation that has become reversible, and in this sense it is comparable to an operation. (1967, pp. 58-59)

Extensive attention has been given to Piaget's view of the relations between morality and affectivity because this is an important ingredient in his theory of moral development and hence an important issue in the comparison of his theory and his practical suggestions for moral education with other theories and moral education programs.

UNITY IN DEVELOPMENT

It is already obvious that Piaget believes there is an organic or 'functional' unity "that binds cognitive, playful, affecti ve, social, and moral reactions into a whole"(1969, p. 128). "It is precisely this unity of behavior," he explains, "which makes the factors of development common to both the cognitive and the affective aspects; and their irreducibility in no way rules out a functional parallelism which is rather striking even in details"(1969, p. 158). For him these aspects are parallel, not subordinated. Growth is "the unfolding of a long, integrated process that may be characterized as a trasition from subjective centering in all areas to a decentering that is at once cognitive, social, and moral"(1969, p. 128). The various aspects of human behavior, he asserts, "form an indissoluble whole" (1973, p. 69). Whence his argument that the "full development of the personality in its most intellectual aspects is indissoluble from the whole group of emotional, ethical, or social relationships that make up school life. .... In reality," he concludes, "education constitutes an indissolube whole, and it is not possible to create independent personalities in the ethical area if the individual is subjected to intellectual constraint to such an extent that he must restrict himself to learning by rote without discovering the truth for himself." (What would he say to those guardians of the public morality who would restrict intellectual inquiry in the name of moral well-being?) For Piaget, "if he is intellectually passive, he will not know how to be free ethically. Conversely, if his ethics consist exclusively in submission to adult authority, and if the only social exchanges that make up the life of the class are those that bind each student individually to a master holding all power, he will not know how to be intellectually active"(1973, pp. 106-107). As Piaget sees it, the necessary and sufficient conditions for intellectual development and for moral development are identical. We now examine them.

CONSTRAINT AND FREEDOM For Piaget the process of moral development involves a freeing of the self from the constraint of older persons and of the law itself as external heteronomous controls. The young child's unconscious, natural egocentrism is unwittingly strengthened by adult constraint (1965, p.187). Rules and commands received from respected elders are regarded as "'sacred,' untouchable, and of transcendent origin (1969, p.127). Respect for external authority is the basis of obedience and of the sense of obligation or duty, as well as guilt for failures (1967, p. 36). The child's spontaneous realism combines with adult constraint to produce a moral realism (1965, p. 186). Rules imposed on the child have a "uniform character of exteriority and sheer authority"(1965, p. 186). "Obligations and values are determined by the law or order itself, independent of intentions and relationships. This moral realism leads to objective responsibility whereby an act is evaluated in terms of the degree to which it conforms to the law rather than with reference to whether there is malicious intent to violate the law or whether the intent is good but in involuntary conflict with the law (1969, 125-126)." The anomy (normlessness) of the egocentric child is replaced by heteronomy through the influence of adult constraint. This heteronomy is rooted in the child's dependency and unilateral respect for adults (1973, pp. 116-117). It is only as the child gains some personal freedom or autonomy from external constraint, often prompted by experiences of moral disappointment and moral conflict, and the concomitant development of powers of critical reflection, that the person can achieve moral autonomy. There is a strange paradox involved in the attainment of personal freedom, however. Liberation from heteronomy can only be attained through experiences of cooperation which generate mutual respect (1965, p. 107). Cooperation is another key concept in Piaget's moral development theory.

COOPERATION Piaget has always insisted that"the relationships between the child and the various other persons in his environment play a basic role in the formation of ethical feelings" (1973, p. 113). Adult constraint fostered heteronomy; adult mistakes and exposure to the divergent opinions of others prompts the emergence of autonomy. It is through cooperative experiences that autonomy becomes reciprocal and moral maturity is attained. Direct transmission of values plays a minor role (1973, pp. 44-46) compared to the indirect construction of reciprocity based on mutual respect in collaborative projects and play. When the growing person becomes capable of intellectual operations, he becomes capable of genuine co-operations with others.(1969, p. 129) Cooperation leads to a primacy of intentionality in moral evaluations (1965, pp. 189-190). True cooperation is such that each makes allowance for his own individuality and for the realities held in common (1965, p. 92). Mutual respect develops, whereby the norms of authority are replaced "by that norm immanent in action and in consciousness themselves, the norm of reciprocity in sympathy"(1965, p. 107). Cooperation delivers the child from the limitations of egocentrism and of external constraint (1965, p. 187). "It is only through contact with the judgements and evaluations of others" that the child's "affective anomy will gradually yield to the pressure of collective .... moral laws."(1965, pp.400-404). Critical discussion among equals leads the individual to judge objectively the acts and commands of other people, including adults, and to interiorize rules. Social exchanges lead to coordination of points of view (1969, p. 129). Rules are now viewed as the result of agreement among equals and as changeable by means of democratic consensus (1965, p. 318; 1969, p. 127). Such "collective" rules are "the SUI GENERIS product of life lived in common."

Piaget explains this process as follows:

> There must be born of the actions and reactions of individuals upon each other the consciousness of a necessary equilibrium binding upon and limiting both "alter" and "ego". And this ideal equilibrium, dimly felt on the occasion of every quarrel and every peace-making, naturally presupposes a long reciprocal education of the children by each other.(1965, p.318)

The eleven-year-old rediscovers the creativity of the infant, but with a new dimension-- he invents nothing without the collaboration of equals (1965, p. 100). Both intellectual and moral development require "a collective milieu" as the context for "experimental actions and spontaneous investigations" in free collaboration. "Collective living," Piaget insists, "has been shown to be essential to the full development of the personality in all its facets." (1965, p. 400; 1973, pp. 107-109) Evolution to moral maturity involves a transition from dependence through a dialectical diminution of dependence and emergence of personal independence to an inter-dependence rooted in mutual respect acquired through collaborative experiences.(Cf. Sprinthall 1976, p. 51) Neither personal independence nor reciprocity "can be developed in an atmosphere of authority and intellectual and moral constraints. On the contrary, they both demand a return, by their very make-up, to the "lived" experience and to freedom of investigation, outside of which any acquisition of human values is only an illusion." (1973, p. 126) Progress in collaboration and mutual respect transforms the child's view of punishment so as "to gradually eliminate the idea of expiation from the idea of punishment, and to reduce the latter to a simple act of reparation, or a simple measure of reciprocity." (1965, p. 322) In this matter, Piaget argues, "by resorting to reciprocity instead of authority, a way of building confidence instead of punishing is opened up which encourages the development of moral personality more than any restriction or external discipline."(1973, p. 124)

There are two further aspects of Piaget's theory regarding cooperation which are of interest. First is his insistence that the moral equality which mutual respect and reciprocity recognizes "is not the result of an advance towards homogeneity," for it is reciprocity "rather than identification. The morality of the autonomous conscience does not tend to subject each personality to rules that have a common content; it simply obligates individuals to"place" themselves in reciprocal relationship with each other without letting the laws of perpsective resultant upon this reciprocity destroy their individual points of view."(1965, p.397) Piaget values differentiation rather than conformity, for it is the differences between people which furnish the opportunities for working out reciprocities which respect individualities. The second feature of Piaget's theory of reciprocal cooperation is the recognition that "like all spiritual realities".... RECIPROcity has two aspects: reciprocity as fa ct, and reciprocity as ideal."(1965, p.323) The former motivates the young persons' insistence upon equal treatment in the application of justice; the latter supports the view that "what is regarded as just is no longer reciprocal action, but primarily behavior that admits of indefinitely sustained reciprocity," an equity that takes into consideration circumstances and other variables in the administration of justice.(Ibid.)

THOUGHT AND ACTION An important feature of Piaget's moral development theory is his view of the relations between thought and action, between theory and practice. For him, concrete collaborative actions and experiments are the occasions for building structures of logic and ethics. Action precedes thought. He is firm about this primacy of real activity:

> Without a doubt it is necessary to reach abstraction, and this is even natural in all areas during the mental development of adolescence, but abstraction is only a sort of trickery and deflection of the mind if it doesn't constitute the crowning stage of a series of previously uninterrupted concrete actions. The true cause of failures in formal education is therefore essentially the fact that one begins with language (accompanied by drawings, fictional or narrated actions, etc.) instead of beginning with real and material action. (1973, pp. 103-104)

In the above quote Piaget is focussing primarily, but not exclusively on logical development, but he quickly adds that "the problem of ethical education is exactly parallel to those we have been discussing regarding logical or mathematical training"(1973, p. 109). Mental operations are internalized versions of actions exercised on real things. Real experiences are the raw material of mental operations. But even when the person reflects on these experiences, "structural change", as Selman reminds us (1976), "is not an immediate reaction." It "requires some time for students to think over their reasoning and to construct for themselves more adequate levels of conceptualization." What Selman says about moving from one moral judgement level to another is but an instance of the "law of conscious realization" and the resulting time-lag which Piaget makes much of.(1965, p.85) He reminds us that "the conscious realization implied in all theoretical reflection does not merely repeat after a greater or lesser interval, what has effectively taken place in practical actions. There are, over and above the delays, distortions inherent in the very mechanism of reflection." (1965, p.185) There will thus be distortions in the child's judgements about his own past actions. When asked about the actions of other people, the child's judgement is often further complicated because "moral realism will last longer with regard to the evaluation of other people's conduct than with regard to that of one's own."(1965, p.183)

> The spontaneous moral realism of the early years, while it dwindles progressively with regard to the subject's own

> conduct, may very well develop elsewhere, first in the evaluation of other people's actions, and finally in reflection concerning purely theoretical cases involved in stories, in histories, and in social myths in general. (1965, P.185)

Hence, too, Piaget's observation that "objective responsibility can perfectly well have been discarded long ago on the level of action, and yet subsist on the level of theoretical thought."(1965, p. 177) Regarding the persistence of moral realism in the evaluation of purely verbal examples presented to the child in stories, Piaget warns us that "when he simply has stories told to him, he will be led to make judgements devoid of pity and lacking in psychological insight, testifying therefore to a more or less systematic moral realism, whereas in real life he would undoubtedly sympathize with those whom from afar he regards as the greatest sinners."(1965, pp. 184-185). These warnings are fraught with implications not only for moral development researchers, but also for moral educators who use verbal discussions of real or fictional events either as tools for classifying levels of moral development or as techniques for stimulating moral growth. There is a gap between the behavior of the young person and his theoretical reflection about it, and a big difference between his evaluation of an event he produces or observes and his evaluation of a fictional narrative.

EDUCATION AND SCHOOLS It is obvious by now that Piaget believes moral learning must begin with action and concrete experiences before there can be valid reflection and subsequent verbalizing. To those who would encourage this growth Piaget admits that

> there is nothing more difficult for the adult than to know how to appeal to the spontaneous and real activity of the child or adolescent. Only this activity, oriented and constantly stimulated by the teacher, but remaining free in its attempts, its tentative efforts, and even its errors, can lead to .... independence. (1973, pp. 105-106)

Adults bear a responsibility for ensuring the necessary "formative social milieu"(1973, pp. 46,52,53) that moral development requires, and they delegate some of this educational responsibility to the school. For Piaget there are, sadly, striking similarities between the goals and efforts of traditional formal education and the initiation rites of primitive tribes (1973, pp. 88-89); he does not consider such an education appropriate to the challenges of life in our times. He prefers more democratic and 'active' learning opportunities (1973, padsim; 1965, pp. 364, 405), where "the initiative is left to the children in the actual conduct of their work"(1965, pg.405). If we are "to create individuals capable of intellectual and moral autonomy and of respecting this autonomy in others by applying the rule of reciprocity that makes it legitimate for themselves,"(1973, p. 91) then we must view the school as "a center of real (and experimental)activities carried out in common" so that logic and ethics "may be elaborated through action and social exchanges."(1973, pp. 47-48) Educators must utilize "the psychological and sociological knowledge of laws of mental development, and methods and techniques adjusted to the innumerable basic principles that these studies provide the educator." (1973, p.54) What are the methods by which the school, as social milieu, "will achieve the best formative results?"(1973, p.54) What methods will help "to de-center the individual, to make him spontaneously give up his subjective or egocentric attitudes, and to lead him to reciprocity?"(1973, p. 131) They must involve something other than "a simple transmission of rules," or imposing "a certain obedience in accord with the intellectual obligation to retain and repeat certain 'lessons'." The child must be given scope to exercise his "right truly to construct or at least to participate in the elaboration of the discipline that will obligate those very same persons who

collaborated in this elaboration." This implies "more than a right to acquire knowledge or to listen, and more than an obligation to obey; it is a question of a right to forge certain precious spiritual tools in everyone, which requires a specific social environment not made up exclusively of submissiveness," since "personality development really requires a free and spontaneous activity in a social milieu based on collaboration." /The student has "the right to find in these schools all that is necessary to the building of a questioning mind and a dynamic moral conscience."(1973, p.92) "Do we not wish," Piaget asks, "to form simultaneously free consciences and individuals who respect the rights and freedoms of others?"(1973, p. 110) How, then, do we provide such a formative milieu, which presupposes relationships "that are more complex between teachers and student and among the students themselves"(1973, p. 54)?

(1973, pp. 51-54)

PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS Piaget suggests that

> it becomes evident that neither the teacher's authority nor the best lessons he can give on the subject suffices to engender living, dynamic relationships, comprised of both independence and reciprocity. Only a social life among the students themselves--that is, self-government taken as far as possible and parallel to the intellectual work carried out in common--will lead to this double development of personalities, masters of themselves and based on mutual respect. (1973, p. 110)

The two basic suggestions Piaget reiterates are: investigation in common (GROUP WORK) and the social life of the students themselves (SELF-GOVERNMENT).(1965, pp. 404-406; 1973, p. 140) Piaget defines learning as 'spontaneous (self-initiated) collaborative investigation by action and experiment on the real material and social world."(1973, passim) Such learning requires more than "verbal teaching" which "can be useful only when prepared by preliminary activity. .... If, as has been said, a lesson should be a response, it becomes necessary .... that this response

be preceded by spontaneous questions directly related to this activity."(1973, p. 129) Group work in which collaborators investigate what they have either proposed or freely adopted, and for the execution of which they bear genuine responsibility provides the conditions of both cognitive and moral growth. This work should take the form of action and experiment on material or social realities. There is also obviously some measure of self-government included in this suggestion. But Piaget goes further and argues that in the social, as well as their academic, activities, students should [illegible] maximum scope for self-regulation. "Many experiments," he reports, "show the results of self-government when it has not been artificially imposed and hence conctradictory, but rather when it corresponds to the spirit of the entire school."(1973, p. 110) Furthermore, he argues, the results of diverse investigations "are convergent: discipline endured from outside either snuffs out the whole ethical personality or obstructs more than favors its formation. It provides a kind of compromise between the external layer of obligations or of conformist behavior and an "ego" always centeredon itself, since no free and constructive activity has allowed it to experience reciprocity with others."(1973, p.119) To achieve the "de-centering of the ego and building of an independent discipline, which we have recognized as necessary to the education of the ethical personality," we must permit the student "to work out the rules and the discipline that will obligate him or to work with others to alter them.(1973,p.118) This self-government is also the source of genuine discipline. "The spontaneuos social organization of the children themselves" permits them to "work out a discipline where necessity is discovered in action itself, instead of being received ready-made before being able to be understood." (1973, p. 121) Such an arrangement will "lead the child to construct for himself the tools that will transform him from

the inside--that is, in a real sense, and not only on the surface." (1973, p.121) This experience of self-government is also an effective form of 'civic' education. Piaget argues:

> What is the best method to make a pupil a future good citizen? .... The experience of self-gvoernment in the school so that the child knows by experience. .... We even maintain that if it should be necessary to sacrifice the teaching of "civic instruction" to the practice of self-government, the latter would produce better citizens than the finest lessons, and that if these lessons are given without social experience to support them, their practical results risk being of little worth.(1973, p.130)

It is interesting to notice that Piaget, though he insists as always that educators must understand what developmental psychology and the social sciences can tell us about human growth, nowhere recommends that teachers or other educators should diagnose or classify individual children so as to be able to prescribe growth-enhancing activities. His remarks about the state of measurement (1973) would suggest that he doesn't think we have sophisticated enough instruments of evaluation. His indication that it takes up to two years to train a child-interviewer for his research would suggest that untrained investigators should be especially wary of labelling individual subjects. His many scattered recommendations for moral education seem to indicate that moral growth is a 'natural' or 'spontaneous' outcome of certain kinds of learning experiences in a certain kind of social milieu. Providing this milieu and those experiences would seem to be the best the conscientious educator can do. The person's dynamic thrust toward development will motivate growth. The educator must learn to TRUST THE THRUST!

LAWRENCE KOHLBERG In scrutinizing Kohlberg's contributions, I shall leave to professional psychologists the appraisal of the design, execution, and interpretation of his empirical research. Here I wish to examine his moral development theory and his practical suggestions for moral education.

To Kohlberg we are indebted for his effort to uncover the development of moral judgement. Piaget had done it for logical development and had suggested that moral development would parallel the logical. I am grateful to Kohlberg for his comprehensive overview of the research on human psycho-sexual development and on human moral development (Kohlberg 1969), and for his penetrating critique of the purported supporting research for the maturationist and for the environmental conditioning theories of moral growth (Ibid.) He has revived keen interest in Piaget and in a developmental approach to the explanation of human growth. Against the instinctualism of the Rreudians and the behaviorism of the social conditioners he has defended, successfully I think, the cognitive aspect of the moral. He has refuted the emotivism and relativism of Positivist philosophers and others. (Kohlberg & Turiel, 1971) For his insistence that the schools desist from their pretense at moral neutrality and take seriously their inescapable role as moral educataors, we ought to be grateful. For his focussing of attention on the educational institution as a moral community and on the importance of institutional justice in the experience of the growing person, we should thank him. Our present purpose is to take a closer look at the moral development theory he proposes, and then at the practical measures he recommends for promoting moral growth.

Kohlberg did not have to wait long for critical response from the educational philosophers. He has been accused of either

neglecting or giving inadeq uate attention to other persons' influence as behavior models (Barclay 1976, p. 31; Proudfoot 1977, p. 152), the role and the concept of 'habit' in moral learning and moral development theory, respectively (Proudfoot pp.151-152; Sichel 1976a, p. 337), moral motivation (Sholl, pp. 371-2)--especially in the young child (Fowler 1976, pp. 210-211), the moral significance of 'consequences' (Bressler, p.5), 'intention' as a vital ingredient in the moral (Craig 1977, p. 149), the influence of the cultural context on moral judgements (Stanton, pp. 612-613, 619), the relation between situation-specific judgements and the tendency toward generality of moral thought (Hall & Davis, p.102), requisite theoretical analysis (Sizer 1975, p. 142; Sichel 1976b, p. 220), the critical role of emotion and sensitivity in moral decision and action (Proudfoot, p.151; Sichel 1976b, p. 218; Aronfreed, p.190; Peters, p.289; Fraenkel, p. 305; Sullivan 1977, p.15), the role of imagination (Sullivan 1977, p.23), the difference between the logical or mathematical judgement and the moral judgement (Sichel 1976b, p.217), the reality of what is called 'moral blindness'(Sullivan 1977, p.26), the importance of understanding lifestyle in evaluating moral behavior (Oliver & Bane, p. 361). Kohlberg is taken to task for belittling the direct teaching of rational skills valuable for moral judging (Kohlberg & Turiel, p.450; Hall & Davis, p. 49). He calls himself a Platonist, but is really a pupil of Socrates (Proudfoot, esp. p. 153), one critic claims.

Kohlberg is respected for having restored cognitive respectability to morality at a time when 'emotive' theories seemed to prevail. Many commentators agree that morality "is not just a matter of practice and habit;" it includes an important cognitive dimension (Wilson 1972, p.11). Some agree that"moral thought is a necessary precondition for moral action"(Fenton in Brandt,

p. 488), and that "growth in the capacity to reason morally is a major, necessary condition of moral development"(Beck, p.1). Many commentators, however, do not agree with Kohlberg's claim that "moral judgement .... is the single most important or influential factor yet discovered in moral behavior"(Kohlberg 1976, p. 181). Some who do agree still think that Kohlberg "places too much emphasis on the role of cognitive development as necessary condition for ego development and moral development"(Loevinger, p. 63). Phenix suggests that "to hold that value education is primarily intellectual education is perhaps too one-sided a way of putting the matter" (Phenix, p. 154) and Chazan argues that "being moral is irreducible to any one factor"(p.38). Proudfoot suggests that Kohlberg's "identification of morality with a logic of justification causes him to lose sight of the act"(p. 155). Kohlberg's assumptions about the relationship between moral judgement and moral behavior have drawn much critical flack. Broudy reminds us that "scoundrels godd at casuistry and atheists adept at theology are not uncommon"(p. 52). The claim that "there is a significant correlation between a person's level of moral reasoning .... and the morality of his or her actions" has no basis in firm evidence (Aron 1977b, p. 209; cf. Craig 1974, pp. 126-127). Aronfreed argues that "there is frequently little apparent relationship between a child's actions and his knowledge of common standards for the evaluation of the actions"(p. 189). Collins is convinced that Kohlberg's "theory does not make clear the relationship between the quality of a person's moral reasoning and the morality of his actions"(p. 199). Some critics complain that a one-sided cognitive concern is carried over from the theory to the educational proposals Kohlberg suggests. Havighurst suggests that Kohlbergians "permit words to stand for deeds"(p. 170), while

Orr remarks that he is "very uneasy with an educational sectarianism that equates socialization into the life styles of dominant communities with adult authoritarianism"(p.371) and suggests that Kohlberg's anti-authoritarian opposition to socialization is excessive and unrealistic. Others argue that he has not found in the criterion of justice a content-free criterion of moral goodness (Beck & Sullivan, pp. 12-13; Crittenden 1972, pp. 14-23). Sullivan concludes that "the subtle form/content distinction made by Kohlberg is an untested assumption rather than an unquestioned reality."(1975, p. 93)

Many commentators have had difficulties with Kohlberg's developmental-stage model. Wilson states that the idea of 'stages of development' is one which he has "for some years tried, but always failed, to understand"(1977, pp.43-44). Aronfreed (1971) suggests alternative ways of viewing moral growth. Kohlberg himself participated in a fascinating discussion (Beck et al., pp. 355-372) in which his professional peers raised a multitude of questions about his stage model and its limitations. Phillips & Kelly (1975) expose some unsuspected difficulties with developmental stage models. The neatness with which Kohlberg delineates the different stages and substages in his model may explain Hall & Davis' questioning whether the stage sequence is consecutive or cumulative (p.103). Phillips & Kelly argue that his cited evidence "fails to support his claim that stage sequence is invariant"(pp.366-368). And Narveson contends that"the hypothesis of unskippable stages is simply false"(Beck et al., 359). Kohlberg's claim that the stages are universal is challenged both on the grounds that his sample is too small to warrant such a sweeping conclusion (Fraenkel, p.294) and because it is inconsistent with "the considerable evidence relating to the complexity and cultural variability of moral judgement"(Stanton, p. 618). His explanation of stage-transition is called

inadequate, vague,and unspecified (Hall & Davis, pp.101-102; Aron 1977a, p.210). The explanation is also criticized for being elaborated primarily in terms of the content of the individual's thought rather than in structural terms (Aron 1977a). Fraenkel argues that "the assertion that higher-stage reson is not only different but morally <u>better</u> than lower-stage reasoning .... seems tobe an impossible one to prove."(p.295) McBride's criticism of Fowler reminds us of the danger that an external logical construct imposed on people may masquerade as the revelation of an inherent order in the phenomena (Pp. 214 ff.). Kohlberg does not explain a core feature of his theory, "the existence of a positive force, a telos, that is moving in the direction of more sophisticated and more comprehensive moral judgements, ... this natural impulse toward growth"(Purpel & Ryan, p. 175) which the educator must facilitate. Sichel (1976b) complains that Kohlberg has not demonstrated "why a stage six life is the ultimate good life"(p. 215). Sullivan argues that stage-development theory and the social sciences in general subordinate the personal and the communal to the impersonal scientific, where the opposite ought to be the case (1977, pp. 31-34). Many critics will allow the use of the developmental stage model as a heuristic device (Hall & Davis, p.99; Sullivan 1977, pp. 34, 43), suggesting that it be supplemented with insights from elsewhere (Beck & Sullivan, p. 14). James Rest, a former colleague of Kohlberg, has observed that he has "not found stage-typing useful" (Cf. Hogan & Bohannon, p.122).

Kohlberg supports his theory by appeal to his own and others' empirical studies, both of which have been questioned. Loevinger, for example, accuses Kohlberg of confusing a profile with a distribution (p.60) and that he suffers from a "confusion of models"(<u>Ibid</u>.). Rest (1976, pp264) finds many difficulties with the Blatt studies.

Sichel (1977) argues that John Rawls' own theory of moral development is better than Kohlberg's, since it provides the missing philosophic framework and has a greater explanatory power.

Oliver (Beck et al., pp. 396-397) complains that the concern for distinguishing structure from content leads to a critical neglect of the content of moral judging. Hogan & Bohannon (P.121) believe that structure and content are confoounded in the Kohlberg research design. Sichel (1976b, p. 219)obseves that Kohlberg "seems to confuse the process of making a moral judgement with justification of a moral judgement."

A criticism of Kohlberg's research tools that has implications for his theoretical conclusions and for his practical pedagogical suggestions focuses on the moral dilemmas he utilizes and recommends. The Forishas explain that

> Kohlberg rejects the notion, at least as far as adolescents and young adults are concerned, that the content of the moral dilemmas revolve around immediate and real-life issues of the classroom. Rather he prefers"hypothetical and remote, but obviously morally real and challenging conflict situations. .... The content of the instruction is not necessarily nor always relevant to the immediate life of the student. (pp. 38-39)

Aron (1977b) complains that these dilemmas "are so abstracted and oversimplified that they bear only a faint resemblance to actual human experience(p.517)." "Some of the dilemmas," Fraenkel notes, "are rather narrow in scope, "as simple as possible." But dilemmas in real life are rarely simple."(p. 302) Stanton complains about the use of such dilemmas in empirical research efforts (p.614), and argues that the use of everyday situations would take into consideration the fact that moral judgements are, "to a great extent, environmentally influenced and cannot, as Kohlberg (1970) suggests, 'be defined independently of the specific content of particular decisions or actions.'"(P.612) Stanton argues that an appre-

ciation of cultural factors "would appear to be of particular importance in the study of moral judgements at adolescence."(P. 619) Fenton suggests beginning with canned dilemmas in moral education contexts, with a later move to focus on real dilemmas (Cf. Brandt, p. 492).

Simpson (1974; cf. Hall & Davis, p.104) shows that Kohlberg's topology is not universal, but culturally biased. Sams (1975) finds the stage theories inadequate in their treatment of the underprivileged child and as a source for "suggestions for both moral development and moral education in the practical realm of moral decision-making" for the low-income, minority individual (pp. 637,640). Sullivan argues that the normative stage six 'model of man' is "not universal but rather to some extent parochial in character" and traces its roots to early liberal thought. Abstract formalism, Sullivan argues, is a "mask for middle-class ideology"(1977, p.10). Liberal theory treats "the person as an isolated, independent entity" who cooperates only when the terms of cooperation are such as to further his own ends as an individual. (Sullivan 1977, pp.11-13) Proudfoot accuses Kohlberg of a "certain elitism" for another reason: he focusses concern about morality on sophisticated forms of moral thought while society's problems are behavioral.(1977)

Kohlberg has claimed (1971d) that he has committed the 'naturalistic fallacy' and gotten away with it by deriving imperatives for moral education from facts about moral development. Giarelli (1976) argues that Kohlberg has done no such thing, and Scriven (Beck et al., p. 356) agrees. In any case, Kohlberg has set forth suggestions for promoting moral growth. It is to criticisms of these practical suggestions that we now turn our attention.

Kohlberg' Practical Suggestions To those who are interested in fostering moral growth, Kohlberg offers a program that is simple in appearance, but fraught with difficulties. The moral educator should engage the person in a discussion of a moral dilemma similar to those which Kohlberg used in his research. In the supervision of such discussions, Kohlberg advises that "the teacher must know the child's level of thought, match his level by communicating at the level directly above, focusing on reasoning, and help the child experience the type of conflict that leads to an awareness of the greater adequacy of the next stage"(1972a; Kohlberg & Turiel, p.455). Duska & Whelan, in their helpful guidebook, echo the same instructions(1975, pp. 104-105, 111). Porter & Taylor (1972) and Galbraith & Jones(1976) have published handbooks to assist the teacher in the diagnosis of moral development levels and the use of the discussion dilemmas. Rest points out that there is still need to specify "the clinical or teaching skills necessary" for such an undertaking(1976, p.272). Kohlberg has cautioned that it "takes considerable thought and understanding of the theory to assign an individual a stage score" (1973b, p.1), and he admits the difficulties that attend stage labelling (1973b). "Not only," he insists, " is our test not meant to grade children's moral worth, but the teacher neither can nor should grade a child's ultimate worth by any criterion or standard"(Kohlberg & Turiel, p.442). Not only has he witnessed the abuse of such a scale by others (1973b), but he has,wittingly or unwittingly engaged in such labelling himself on more than one occasion (cf. Aron 1977a, pp. 213-214). There is, then, the danger of abusing the results of individuals' stage classification. Of more intrest to educators is the claim of the critics that such a project as Kohlberg advocates is both unfeasible and undesirable.

Chazan questions Kohlberg's assumption "that the goal of moral education is that the child become a moral philosopher"(p.34). Barclay argues that "values are not decided upon simply by some problem-solving method in which alternate solutions are posed and rational judgement used to decide the best alternative"(p. 29). From these few comments it is obvious that Kohlberg has not convinced everyone of his views about the relation between moral judgement and moral behavior.

Kohlberg, critics suggest, defines morality too narrowly (Aron 1977a, p. 207; Hall & David, p. 106; Crittenden 1971, p.317). Peters says Kohlberg "suffers from the rather touching belief that a Kantian type of morality .... is the only one"(p.288). He is criticized for believing that "a morality based on the concept of justice is the only type of morality that is defensible"(Fraenkel, p. 295), for implying that"Western philosophers are in agreement on this point"(Hall & Davis, p. 105), when there is "just too much evidence to the contrary"(Fraenkel, p. 295; cf. Kirschenbaum 1973, p. 123). Sullivan suggests that narrow concentration on justice limits attention to "only one facet of the moral reasoning process, albeit a compelling one"(1975, p. 93). Collins thinks that the narrow focus on justice attempts "to channel moral concerns exclusively into development within the political dimension," and "to focus primarily on individuals as instruments in the achievement os socio-political community"(pp.205,207). His third-person perspective keeps him from acknowledging first- and second-person perspectives so that he excludes from morality such considerations as personal ideals and integrity on the one hand and interpersonal commitment or love on the other hand(Collins; Crittenden 1971, pp. 317 ff.).

Hamm (1977) argues that Kohlberg's reasons for abandoning the 'bag of virtues' approach to moral education are not defensible.

Fraenkel argues that "the theory places unrealistic demands on classroom teachers once they do engage students in moral discussions"(1976, p. 296) Use of the classification tool is a skill which cannot be mastered overnight, "and a teacher should not assume that he can apply it easily"(Hall & Davis, p. 107). Furthermore, the second requirement (of providing optimum match by communicating at the level directly above) is naive. Rest speaks of the "unrealistic expectation that the discussion leader can compose +1 verbalizations on the spot" (1976, p. 264). Hall & Davis suggest that "individual testing .... may have undesirable side effects (like I Q tests) of focussing attention too closely on precise stages of thought. Since the stages are not themselves rigid patterns, they should not and cannot properly be used for any rigid classification"(p. 108). They argue that "precise calculation of each student's level of moral thought is not necessary for a program of moral education"(pp. 107, 148-149). Fenton thinks these difficulties have been exaggerated (Brandt 1977). Lange (1977) argues that Kohlberg's objectives in moral education are "internally inconsistent and vague and ambiguous". Others, even admitting how helpful Kohlberg's research has been, do not find his theory an adequate basis for moral education (Fraenkel, p. 304; Hall & Davis, p. 99). Sizer has complained that "few contemporary schools can be little, warm democracies ofthe kind Kohlberg envisions" (1975, p. 142). Kohlberg has turned his attention to the experimental creation of 'just communities' within prisons and schools, a move which seems to give improved attention to the social context of the individual's moral growth(cf. 1976, pp. 192-195).

KOHLBERG AND PIAGET Comparison of Kohlberg's moral development theory and his educational proposals with those of Piaget is very instructive. Few of Kohlberg's critics reveal any familiarity with Piaget's ideas (Sullivan (1977) and Wilson, Williams, & Sugarman (1967) are exceptions). There are times when one wonders how familiar with Piaget's thought Kohlberg himself is! In Kohlberg's presentation of his stage development model he appears much more confident than Piaget about the appropriateness of such a model for moral development. More importantly, he seems less aware than Piaget that such a model is a hypothetical construct imposed on the data rather than an adequate description of complex real facts. Kohlberg's presentation of the different stages, with very different kinds of motives assigned to each, could give the impression that they are very discrete and even consecutive, where Piaget views the different periods of moral growth as shifts in the proportionate presence of always-present elements. Kohlberg's treatment of emotion, of affectivity is very different from Piaget's. In his efforts to restore the cognitive aspect of morality to its rightful place, Kohlberg subordinates the affective to the cognitive, where Piaget insists that they are correlative, indissociable, and irreducible. There can be little doubt in the mind of the careful reader that Piaget attributes a far more important role to affectivity in moral development than does Kohlberg. Kohlberg's presentation also fails to stress the functional unity of the different aspects of human growth. Kohlberg goes too far, also, in his criticism of constraint and authoritarianism. He seems to have little respect for the motivations of persons unless they are at stage six. Piaget recognized the inevitability

and even the desirability at very early age of some constraint. Piaget made a careful distinction between legitimate authority and harmful authoritarianism and recognized the role of authority in the socialization of the young. Kohlberg focusses on the subjective individual judgement about the universalizability of a chosen moral principle, where Piaget stresses the social roots of such convictions in cooperative experiences. Kohlberg's stage six moral agent appears to be a solo flyer, a moral rebel, whereas Piaget's morally mature person is inextricably entwined in a freely chosen collective reciprocity with others. Furthermore, Kohlberg suggests that all morally mature persons would agree on moral issues, whereas Piaget explicitly rules out homogeneity of position as possible or desirable. Where Piaget stresses the action origins of thought, Kohlberg is preoccupied with cognition itself. Kohlberg claims much more for the causal connection between cognitive conviction and moral behavior than does Piaget. Piaget's reminders of the "law of conscious realization" and the resulting time-lag would make anyone very cautious in classifying young people's moral judgement status or their moral behavior on the basis of verbal response to fictional simplified dillemas. In describing the desirable school, Piaget puts most emphasis on opportunity to engage in collaborative projects, where Kohlberg seems to view the school as a center for cerebral activity. Kohlberg's moral education program assumes the kinds of experiences which Piaget thinks necessary and finds sadly lacking in most traditional education. Piaget believes that the best learning opportunities are those which 'spontaneously' emerge in the course of the child's activity; Kohlberg advocates presenting pre-selected abstract simplified verbal dilemmas as the principal

stimulus for moral development. Kohlberg has a far greater faith in the ability of verbal discussion to generate cognitive and moral growth than does Piaget, for whom words are tools for expressing thought far more than they are instruments for generating or improving it, especially in the very young. For Piaget, action and experiment are the absolutely necessary sources of intellectual and moral growth. Only a person with a rich font of experiences would have the right, in Piaget's view, to engage in detached reflection. Kohlberg's recent efforts to experiment with 'just communities' indicate a recognition of the influence of social institutions' procedures on the development of the young. He has begun to recognise the importance of at least one affective element: the importance of the experience of a sense of community, and the role that this plays in the development of a moral democracy. These interests are a welcome broadening of perspective from a focus on the cerebral to an inclusion of the affective and of the collective dimensions of moral growth. On the whole, however, what Kohlberg has given us so far is not Piagetian. It is interesting that Kohlberg compares his model of moral judgement development not with Piaget's outline of the evolution of moral judgement, but with Piaget's model of logical or cognitive development. It would seem that Kohlberg was inspired by Piaget's stage model, but it seems seriously questionable that he ever took the time to study Piaget carefully. Had he done so, he might have avoided many of the criticisms which his statements have provoked, and to which he has provided no adequate responses. Sullivan(1977) argues convincingly that Kohlberg's theory and his practice are rooted in a questionable unexamined ideology. They are not rooted in the work of Jean Piaget.

VALUES CLARIFICATION: Values clarification is a process, a technique for using the process, and a movement. As a movement it has spread like a wind-whipped forest fire. Simon & deSherbinin(1975) have attempted to summarize its roots, its strategies, its specific aims, its many present adaptations, and its future prospects, as well as its affinities to the human potential movement. As a technique it has been adapted to a very wide variety of uses (Raths, Harmin, & Simon 1966; Simon, Howe, & Kirschenbaum , 1972; Kirschenbaum & Simon, 1973; Casteel & Stahl 1975; Brian Hall 1973a, 1973b; Hall & Smith 1973; Hawley 1974; Howe & Howe 1975; Kirschenbaum 1977; Hawley, Simon, & Britton 1973; Simon & Olds 1976). As a process, it consists of seven questionings by which a person can both clarify his values and evaluate whether a preference is a 'true' value.

Values Clarification makes no claims to be based upon its own sophisticated psychological research. It is a development of a model popularized by Louis Raths. Some critics lament themovement's failure to develop "an integrated conceptual framework, a theory"(Stewart, p.686), "its own philosophical foundations and its own clearly formulated objectives"(Forisha & Forisha 1976, p.71) or even "a coherent statement of philosophical assumptions"(Colby, p. 281). Stewart argues that "Values Clarification has accepted, and has remained committed to, an inadequate theory, ... a theory that is philosophically indefensible and psycholgoically inadequate"(1975, p.686). Aron suggests that its shortcomings "stem directly from the inadequacies of the formalist philosophical tradition" in which both it and Kohlberg's theory are grounded (1977b, pp. 513-514). Kazepides (1977) thinks the "authors subscribe to a naive organic view of the nature of value" and that their claim that the theory is based on Dewey's work is "unjustified" because "the relationship between Raths' views and those of John Dewey is superficial"(Pp. 100-103).

Forisha & Forisha complain that "those arguing for values clarification .... fail to specify the origin of values, or the values which are particularly 'valuable' in their eyes"(1976, p. 72). Their treatment of valuing "is superficial and largely unfocussed", says Anderson(1977, p.287). The research offered "to support the validity and efficacy of values clarification is weak and seriously flawed," says Stewart (1975, p. 687). The movement "is rooted in .... an inadequate psychology of instrumental individualism"(Stewart,p.688) and "concentrates exclusively on the private feelings and appetites of the young child" at the expense of the "public world of common understaddings and experience"(Kazepides, p.109). Value clarification, it is argued, is neither morally neutral nor value-free, as it pretends. "Its central commitment to respect for the child and his choosing is in itself a substantive value perspective",remarks Chazan (1976, p. 36). The values clarification methodology is judgemental in some aspects, and its advocates "fail to see how enormously judgemental are many of their questions, techniques, and strategies." They have, argues Stewart (1975) "built a methodology based on their own values, which are frequently in conflict"(P. 685). Kirschenbaum admits that "values clarification is not and never has been 'value free'"(1976, p. 122). A number of critics lament the failure of values clarification advocates to distinguish moral values from non-moral values. All sorts of heterogeneous issues (preferences, tastes, attitudes, feelings, etc. and matters of morality) are lumped together under their umbrella term 'value'. This confuses fundamental moral issues with rather trivial matters, and thus "aggranddizes the trivial while trivializing morality into mere matters of taste." (Kazepides, p. 105; Gluck, pp. 271-272; Colby, p. 280). 'Valuable' is reduced to what is 'valued'(Kazepides, p. 101), means and ends are conflated (Lockwood, p. 158), and the strategies aim, not to

make behavior consistent with stated values, but to bring values in line with behavior (Aron 1977b, p. 522). Lockwood argues that their distinction between values and value-indicators is needlessly arbitrary (1976, p. 157). Furthermore, he adds, they fail to address the question of determining what actions are consistent with what values .... or are entailed by a commitment to them (Ibid.) The values clarification movement is accused of language abuses, of presenting "as a seemingly natural and desirable process" what is "nothing more than a prescription, or recommendation"(Kazepides, p. 102), of radical departure from ordinary language and the creation of a 'private' language of its own (Ibid., p. 101), and of creating "an illusion of significance that can lead one to think that more is happening than is really happening"(Stewart, p. 688). Lockwood thinks that values clarification is, in essence, a form of client-centered therapy, and that the effective psychological processes stimulated by values clarification should not be characterized as rational-intellectual but as emotional-affective (1976, pp. 158-164). Others accuse the values clarification technique of invading the privacy of the participants and of using the coercion of peer pressure in many activities (Gluck 1977; Stewart 1975, p. 684). Kazepides thinks that the "arguments of the values clarification proponents followed to their logical conclusions constitute a betrayal of reason and a retreat into irrationalism"(p. 104).

Gluck (1977) argues that values clarification does not clarify, since it does not ask generic meaning or validity questions nor explore presuppositions. She also explains that it discourages reflection by propelling students into decisions without reflection or analysis by giving them neither the time for reflection nor the tools for analysis.(P. 271)

Values clarification is accused of being rooted in and of advocating an extreme moral relativism.(Stewart, p.686; Anderson,

p. 290; Kazepides, p. 100; Lockwood, p. 166; Wehlage & Lockwood, p.335). Kazepides (p. 100) notes that the values required by the values clarification approach are not, however, considered to be relative.

Each step of the values clarification seven-step process has attracted critical comment. Kirschenbaum calls the seven processes, as criteria, "useful theoretically, but not operational"(1976, p. 119). Forisha &Forisha indicate problems about delineating what is meant by "freely choosing"(p. 73). They further note that the theory neglects the influence of cognitive development level on ability to outline alternatives and consider consequences (Ibid.). They indicate practical problems with the necessary affirmation of beliefs, and with the demand that one should act "repetitively and with a pattern", which could produce a too rigid moral orientation.(P.74) Values clarification proponents seem unaware of difficulties that arise in attempting to discern what we prize (p.72) and they omit consideration of prizing"as caring for, nurturing, or striving to fulfill one's selections."(Anderson, p. 288).

Aron complains that the values clarification 'strategies'"stop short of critical evaluation. ....The proponents of values clarification," she argues, " terminate their exercises at the very point at which discussion of right or wrong, better or worse, would begin." (1977b, p. 519) Kohlberg & Turiel agree that "value-clarification is not an adequate solution to the problems of moral education," both because it leaves unsolved problems and because it "merges into an actual teaching that ethical relativity is true," whereas "ethical relativity is not a scientifically or logically valid belief"(p. 420). Lockwood argues that values clarification represents "an indefensible moral point of view," "a truncated and myopic view of morality," (pp. 164,167) and agrees with Kazepides that it does not qualify as

a theory of moral education (p. 105). Kirschenbaum (1976, p. 124), one of the early principal promoters of the movement, confesses that "in many ways, I wonder if values clarification when considered as a separate educational approach, is any longer a useful concept. Many different approaches, both cognitive and affective, have a part to contribute to the goal of fuller value development." Earlier he had explained that almost a decade ago some of the movement's proponents recognized the need to include, along with values clarification exercises, training in communication skills and exercises in dealing with one's feelings (1973, pp. 93-95), and that it was decided then not to make the values clarification workshops more complex and threatening by including these dimensions. Since then, it is clear from the focuses of his recent publications that Simon has expanded his interest from the strategies themselves to the intrapersonal and social/institutional factors which condition the use of the strategies. He has directed his attention to subjective affectivity (1974 ; 1976a; 1975 ; 1976b; 1975b) and to the procedures of social institutions such as the school (1976d ; 1971). One can only welcome this attention to affective and environmental factors, and the accompanying broadening of horizons about what is involved in moral growth. A concerned educator must be more than a midwife to the revelation and examination of personal preferences. Cognitive discussions are not enough.

PIAGET AND VALUES CLARIFICATION A frequent criticism of the Values Clarification movement is the complaint that its proponents have failed to elucidate the basic philosophical assumptions and the theoretical presuppositions of their claims concerning the valuing process and of the strategies they recommend for its utilization. What few attempts have been made to fill this gap are said to be riddled with inconsistencies and to contradict the actual practice of the movement's promoters. It is difficult, therefore, to compare the movement's theory with Piaget's. Their practical pedagogical practices, however, furnish some salient points of comparison. The insistence that values must be freely chosen and that they must be acted upon more than once are both positions fraught with considerable consequences for the curriculum (overt and covert) and procedures of any school that pretends to promote value concern. In denigrating the "three misleading M's"--moralizing, manipulating, modeling--they are attempting to discourage some of the constraints which Piaget has indicated are inimical to healthy moral growth; but they go too far. Piaget defends the role of modeling, for instance, though he insists it is not as important as the learner's own experiences. He would, I think, welcome the warning that verbal moralizing has little, if any, effect on moral development, unless it be to reinforce in the young an undesirable submission to authority. Piaget would not agree, though, with the broad generalization about the three M's that "none of them teaches anything about values"(Simon & Olds 1976, p.22).

Values Clarification proponents have helped remind us that

there is an important connection between moral conviction and action. In their explanations, however, they focus exclusively on the impact of thought on action, and neglect the Piagetian perspective which emphasizes the influence of action on thought. At best they presuppose the action-experiences which furnish the raw material for moral reflection and confine their pedagogical proposals to the advocacy of predominantly verbal reports and discussions. These verbal activities, to be sure, include self-reports about feelings, public verbal affirmations, and verbal promises or testimonials about repeated concrete actions. What Piaget has to say about the 'law of conscious realization' and about the time-lag between what the child has learned to actually do and the child's ability to consciously reflect upon and then to verbally articulate a new moral practice would make one wary of naively accepting the child's oral remarks as a clear indication of the child's actual moral position. What Piaget says about the child's tendency to verbalize what he or she thinks the adult wants to hear or read must also be kept in view. It is interesting that Piaget has not proposed that moral educators focus their attention on promoting verbal discussion, but on providing opportunities for varieties of experiences of collaboration and self-government. He seems to imply that, given such opportunities, whatever discussion is necessary for moral development will occur 'spontaneously.' Would he oppose such discussions? Without the experiences to give them meaning, he would argue, they are a deceptive waste of time that could reinforce misconceptions about what the moral life really is. Values Clarification may well be a victim of the same liberal social science ideology which Sullivan has found in Kohlberg's views (Sullivan 1977). In any case, the Values Clarification movement has taken one analysis of what

having a value involves--and a very unrefined analysis, some would claim--and has then prescribed a program for learning by following the steps outlines in the analysis. It is not evident that real life always does or should imitate the analytic constructs with which men attempt to organize the chaos of data which reality provides. A hauristic model, however helpful for scientific analysis, is not necessarily or even usually an accurate picture of a natural process; nor does it usually furnish the formula for the deliberate reproduction of the process. It is part of the folly of technocratic man to believe that he can manufacture by deliberate design (and, often, in so doing improve upon) what happens 'spontaneously' or 'naturally' in everyday life. Piaget makes no such mistake. He believes we can't avoid being moral persons. He is convinced that certain kinds of experiences are necessary conditions for moral growth. He tells us to provide these opportunities, and hope for the best. Perhhaps there is nothing else we can do. Perhaps to do other things, but not provide these particular kinds of opportunities is not just a waste of time, but actually harmful. We can only be comfortable with the risks involved in a Piagetian program if we have learned to trust the natural or 'spontaneous' teleology of the growing person, if we have learned to 'TRUST THE THRUST'.

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